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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

be dismissed. And, without the underlying action, the replevin action
was no longer ancillary, and must therefore be vacated.
Although the defendant in possession of a chattel is protected to
a degree by his statutory right to reclaim 173 or to move for an order
impounding the chattel, 174 and by the plaintiff's undertaking 75 it none176
theless is clear that sufficient notice must be afforded the defendant.
Thus, the refusal of the court in Sears to follow the Kurzweil holding,
which previously had been emasculated 177 and questioned, 7 8 serves as
a reminder to the practitioner to commence an action promptly when
seeking to avail himself of the ancillary remedy of replevin.
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CCA 1908: Absence of express statutory authority is not a bar to recovery of necessary litigation expenses.
It can hardly be denied that an examination before trial of an
adverse party has become a necessary procedure in the prosecution of
a lawsuit. Likewise, when circumstances so dictate, an interpreter at
the examination is equally as important. 7 9 However, the question arises
whether a victorious litigant in the New York City Civil Court can
recover disbursements for such expenses from his opponent.
In Santiago v. Johnson'"0 the plaintiff sought an order disallowing
expenditures of this nature as taxable costs on the ground that CCA
1908181 did not grant the authority for the assessments. Nevertheless,
recovery was permitted pursuant to the preamble of CCA 1908 which
limits the allowable disbursements as provided therein "[e]xcept where
the contrary is specifically provided by law ... ." And, the court held
that CPLR 8301(a)(9) was the specific provision allowing the recovery
of expenses of an examination before trial.
8 2 its
While the utilization of 8301(a)(9) is undoubtedly proper,
adoption through the preamble of CCA 1908 is somewhat tenuous. InCPLR 7103(a).
CPLR 7103(b).
176 CPLR 7102(e).
176 Cf. Sniadick v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
177 Devonia Discount Corp. v. Bianchi, 241 App. Div. 838, 271 N.Y.S. 413 (2d Dep't
1934) (per curiam). See also Florence Trading Corp. v. Rosenberg, 128 F.2d 557 (2d Cir.
1942).
7102.02.
178 See 7A W. K. & M.
179 Cf. People ex rel Levy v. Grant, 37 Misc. 430, 75 N.YS. 290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1902).
180 61 Misc. 2d 746, 305 N.YS.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
181 CCA 1908 is the New York City Civil Court provision governing the allowance
of costs to a party in an action or appeal.
182 See 8 W. K. & M. 8301.27.
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deed, the language of the preamble would seem to indicate a means
whereby those disbursements permitted under CCA 1908 can be restricted, not supplemented, if a specific law so provides. Rather, any
expansion of the permissible disbursements should utilize as its sole
basis the "omnibus" provisions of CCA 1908(f).183 Caution, however,
should be utilized when interpreting this subsection. Prior to Santiago,
it had not been construed, 8 4 and earlier and more restrictive cases 18 5
were decided under previous statutes and theories. Thus, although
substantial portions of the earlier laws were retained, 186 the precedental
value of cases decided under the CPA as an aid in construing CCA
1908(f is questionable in view of the liberal construction demanded
of the CPLR provisions which this CCA subsection incorporates.
A second alternative suggested by the Santiago rationale would be
to view CCA 1908(f) as adopting CPLR 8301(a)(12), 18 7 thereby avoiding the $250 limitation contained in CPLR 8301(a)(9). This approach
allows an attorney to "exercise his ingenuity in bringing items of cost
within [CPLR 8301(a)(12)'s] scope in order to shift the finanical burden
u8
of the lawsuit to his adversary."'
In short, the logical interaction of CPLR 8301(a) and CCA 1908(f
provide an attorney with the vehicle by which he can secure payment
of expenses justly incurred in the prosecution of his client's action.
BUSINESS CORPORAnON LAW

BCL 304(a): Court will not vacate default judgment where corporate
defendant had not received notice due to its own neglect.
An action against a corporation may be commenced by service of
process upon an officer, director, managing agent or cashier of the corporation,8 9 by service upon its registered agent, 19 0 or by service upon
the Secretary of State. 191 In the latter instance, service is completed
188 CCA 1908(f) permits the taxation of disbursements for all "reasonable and necessary expenses as are prescribed by law or taxable by express provision of law."
184 Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion at 1, Santiago v. Johnson, 61 Misc.
2d 746, 305 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
185 See, e.g., Landstrom Realty Corp. v. Lamborn, 144 Misc. 701, 259 N.Y.S. 495 (App.
T. 2d Dep't 1932) (error to allow the cost of the minutes of an examination before trial

as a taxable disbursement).
186 See, e.g., FouaRTH REP. 326. Compare CPLR 8301(a) with CPA 1518.
187 CPLR 8301(a)(12) is another "omnibus clause," perhaps even broader than CCA
1908(t). It permits disbursements for "reasonable and necessary expenses as are taxable
according to the course and practice of the court, by express provision of law or by
order of the court." 8 W. K. & M. 8301.24, at 83-36.1.
188 8 W. K. & M.
8801.01, at 88-86.
189 CPLR 311(1).

190 N.Y. Bus. Corn'. L.w § 805 (McKinney 1968) [hereinafter BCL].
191 BCL 304(a). This section, as well as the two previously cited, is applicable to both
domestic and foreign corporations,

